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A ubiquitous feature in environmental economics is that welfare costs and beneﬁts of
projects undertaken to mitigate environmental problems spread over decades or even
centuries (e.g., global climate change, biodiversity loss, depletion of the ozone layer and
disposal of radioactive waste). The problem with the standard exponential discounting
approach, ﬁrst introduced by Samuelson (1937) and put on an axiomatic basis by Debreu
(1954) and Koopmans (1960), is that outcomes in the far distant future are worth close
to nothing for any positive discount rate. In many people’s view this is not the way we
do think or should think about the far distant future. Therefore, discounting has been
a controversial topic, with proposals ranging from ad-hoc adjustments to alternative
axiomatic derivations (e.g., Lind 1982, Rabl 1996, Portney and Weyant 1999, Heal 1998).
One recent approach to deal with the shortcomings of exponential discounting is hy-
perbolic discounting, i.e., the discount rate is not constant but declining over time.1 It
has been advocated for three reasons (for an overview see Pearce et al. 2003, Groom
et al. 2005). First, empirical evidence suggests that decision makers use declining rather
than constant discount rates (e.g., Gintis 2000, Frederick et al. 2002). Second, uncer-
tainty over the future state of the world leads to declining certainty-equivalent discount
rates (e.g., Weitzman 1998, Azfar 1999, Gollier 2002). Third, declining discount rates
are consistent with a rule, which balances the welfare of current and future generations
(e.g., Chichilnisky 1996, Li and L¨ ofgren 2000).
In this paper, we analyze the optimal investment in environmental protection, given
a hyperbolically discounting society, which consists of a series of non overlapping gen-
erations, each represented by a unique agent. To capture the common pattern of many
environmental problems, we assume that the present generation faces the costs of in-
vestment, while the beneﬁts spread over all subsequent generations.
However, as well known from the literature, hyperbolic discounting bears the problem
of time-inconsistency. As Strotz (1956) has pointed out, this implies that an ex ante
optimal decision is not carried out, because a later re-evaluation suggests that it is not
optimal anymore. Time-inconsistent behavior can either be overcome by a commitment
to future actions or, if no commitment mechanism is available, time-consistent planning
is equivalent to solve the non-cooperative sequential investment game all agents play
against each other (Phelps and Pollak 1968). Although the time-inconsistency property
of hyperbolic discounting has been used to model ‘irrational’ behavior, such as addiction
and procrastination (e.g., Ackerlof 1991, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, Brocas and Car-
rillo 2001, Gruber and Koszegi 2001), there is a debate on how serious is the problem
of time-inconsistency in long-term and intergenerational decision making (Pearce et al.
2003). Some authors argue that time-consistency is a requirement which cannot be ex-
pected to hold for the process of social decision making and, therefore, is not an issue of
concern (e.g., Henderson and Bateman 1995, Heal 1998).
Although we agree that time-consistency is hardly met in social decision making, time-
1 The term stems from the use of generalized hyperbolae to model declining discount rates (e.g.,
Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). However, nowadays it is used as a generic term to describe declining
discount rates, independently of their functional form.
1inconsistency can have dramatic consequences. In the model framework described below
we show that, in the absence of a commitment mechanism, investment in environmental
protection will never be carried out, even though it is optimal from an ex ante point of
view to invest in the long run. Moreover, this result holds not only for naive decision
makers (who are not aware of the time-inconsistency problem), but also for sophisticated
decision makers (who anticipate future generations’ deviation from the ex ante optimal
plan). In addition, our results are not limited to special functional forms of hyperbolic
discounting, like the often used quasi hyperbolic discount function (e.g., Laibson 1997,
Laibson 1998, Harris and Laibson 2001), but hold in general.
These results challenge the use of hyperbolic discounting in long-term decision making,
as the outcome is not only unsatisfactory from the present generation’s point of view,
but also often ineﬃcient. Moreover, the results give rise to concern, as they are consistent
with real world observations of unsatisfactory policy performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is introduced. The ex ante
optimal plan is analyzed in section 3, while section 4 is devoted to the ex post im-
plemented plan and the welfare analysis. In section 5, we examine some crucial model
assumptions with respect to the results, and discuss the implications for environmental
policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Investment in environmental protection under hyperbolic
discounting
Consider a project, in which society can invest, that is aimed to decrease the impact of
the society’s economic activity on the natural environment. In the following, this project
is called environmental protection. Environmental protection kt in period t is assumed
to be a capital good, i.e., investments it in diﬀerent periods t accumulate over time
and decay at the constant rate γ ≥ 0. Thus, the equation of motion for environmental
protection is given by:
kt+1 = (1 − γ)kt + it . (1)
Investments it in environmental protection are assumed to be sunk, i.e., de-investment
is not possible and, thus, it ≥ 0 holds for all periods t.
Consider further that the payoﬀ of environmental protection in period t is given by
P(it,kt), which is a strictly concave function in both arguments (partial derivatives are
indicated by subscripts throughout the paper: Pii < 0, Pkk < 0, PiiPkk − P 2
ik > 0). A
central assumption in this model is that welfare costs and beneﬁts of investments in
environmental protection do not accrue at the same time. Without loss of generality, we
assume that costs (investments in environmental protection it) occur before the beneﬁts
(stock of environmental protection kt).2 As a consequence, P is strictly decreasing in it
(Pi < 0) and strictly increasing in kt (Pk > 0). In addition, we assume that the marginal
2 As an example think of the abatement of CO2 to slow down the anthropogenic greenhouse eﬀect.
While the costs occur today, the (insecure) beneﬁts spread over several decades or even centuries
(IPCC 2001).
2costs of investment are non-decreasing with the level of environmental protection, i.e.,
there are no economies of scale in environmental protection (Pik ≤ 0). This amounts
to the assumption that cheap options to enhance environmental quality are chosen ﬁrst
and, thus, marginal costs increase with the level of environmental protection.
In each period t, there is a decision maker, in the following called agent t, who is
in charge of the investment decision it in environmental protection in period t. Each
agent t cares about current and future payoﬀs, but treats past decisions as bygone. All
agents are supposed to exhibit Markov beliefs, i.e., their decisions depend only on the
payoﬀ-relevant state variable (environmental protection kt) and not on the history of





where δn > 0 with n ∈ N0
3 denotes a strictly decreasing and convergent series of discount
factors with δ0 = 1. Equation (2) implies that all agents apply the same discount factors
δn, i.e., the discount factors are invariant over time and do not hinge upon past decisions.
If agents discount exponentially, the discount factors are given by δn = βn with 0 <
β < 1, which implies that for all n,m ∈ N0:
δn+m
δn
= δm . (3)
In the case of hyperbolically discounting agents, we do not assume a special functional
form, but solely postulate that δn =
Qn
s=1βs for all n ∈ N, where 0 < βs < 1 and
{βs}
∞
s=1 denotes a weakly increasing series with at least one s ∈ N so that βs < βs+1.




≥ δm , (4)
where the strict inequality holds at least for one n,m ∈ N.
As Strotz (1956) has shown, there is the potential problem of time-inconsistency
for non-stationary intertemporal preferences (including hyperbolic preferences). Accord-
ingly, an ex ante optimal investment plan, derived by maximizing the present value of
discounted payoﬀs in period t = 1, might be suboptimal if re-evaluated at a later date
t > 1. Time-inconsistency can lead to diﬀerent ex post outcomes, depending on the de-
gree of awareness of the time-inconsistency problem and the possibility of commitment
to future actions.
Following the standard approach, we shall distinguish three diﬀerent behavioral pat-
terns of the agents t. If the agents are committed, they are fully aware of the problem
of time-inconsistency and overcome it by agent 1’s commitment to the ex ante optimal
intertemporal consumption and investment plan. In this case, all successors have to stick
3 N denotes all positive and N0 all non-negative integers.
3to the ex ante optimal plan, even if they would like to alter it according to future re-
evaluations. If the agents do not have the possibility to commit their successors to future
actions, but anticipate their successors’ departure from the ex ante optimal intertempo-
ral plan, the agents are called sophisticated. As recognized by Phelps and Pollak (1968),
time-consistent planning is equivalent to a non-cooperative sequential investment game
the agents t play against each other. Finally, the agents are called naive if they do not
recognize that their preferences are non-stationary. In general, they will alter the plan
derived by their predecessor in every period t.
In the following, we analyze the optimal investment in environmental protection given
that agents are either committed, sophisticated or naive. In particular, we derive con-
ditions under which no investment in environmental protection is carried out ex post,
although this seemed to be optimal ex ante.
3 Ex ante optimal investment plan
First, we derive the ex ante optimal investment plan. This is the plan society achieves
by maximizing the intertemporal welfare in period t = 1, assuming that all future
investment decisions will be carried out according to this plan.
3.1 Intertemporal optimization








kt+1 = (1 − γ)kt + it ,
it ≥ 0 ,
k1 = 0 .
As we do not assume Inada conditions to hold for the payoﬀ function P, one has to
explicitly consider the corner solutions given by it = 0. Introducing the shadow price
pk
t for environmental protection and a Kuhn-Tucker variable pi
t to control for the non-
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t = 0 , (8)
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t ≥ 0 , p
i
tit = 0 . (9)
4 This assumption will be discussed and relaxed in section 5.
4Because of the strict concavity of the Lagrangian (strictly concave objective function
and linear restrictions), these necessary conditions are also suﬃcient if, in addition, the





tkt = 0 . (10)
The strict concavity of the Lagrangian L also ensures the uniqueness of the optimal
investment path {it}∞
t=1.
Equation (8) is a diﬀerence equation, which can be solved unambiguously by taking








Thus, in the optimum the shadow price of environmental protection equals the present
value of the accumulated future welfare gains of an additional marginal unit of envi-
ronmental protection. Inserting the shadow price of environmental protection (11) into
equation (7), one derives the following necessary and suﬃcient condition for an ex ante








Equation (12) states that if positive investment in environmental protection is optimal
in period t (i.e., pi
t = 0), investment is undertaken to such an extent that the marginal
welfare loss at time t due to the investment in environmental protection (left hand side)
equals the present value of the future marginal welfare gains of this investment (right
hand side). However, if this condition cannot be met for any positive investment it, then
no investment in environmental protection is optimal (i.e., pi
t ≥ 0).
3.2 Ex ante optimal investment and postponing investment
Now, we turn to the question under which conditions investment in environmental pro-
tection is optimal at all, and if so, what is the ﬁrst period in which investment is under-
taken. In fact, we show that if investment is optimal at all, investment starts in the ﬁrst
period for exponentially discounting agents, and may be postponed to later periods in
the case of hyperbolically discounting agents. The following proposition elaborates on
this result:
Proposition 1 (Ex ante optimal investment and postponing investment)
Given the ex ante optimal control problem (5), investment in the ﬁrst marginal unit















i = Pi(0,0) and P 0
k = P(0,0).
Moreover, if investment in environmental protection is optimal at all, i.e., there exists
a period t for which condition (13) holds, then
(i) exponentially discounting agents will always invest in period t = 1, and
(ii) postponing the ﬁrst marginal investment into future periods t > 1 may be ex ante
optimal for hyperbolically discounting agents.
Proof: To see condition (13), we start from the necessary and suﬃcient condition (12)
for optimal investment in environmental protection in period t. To derive a condition
for which investment in the ﬁrst marginal unit of environmental protection in period t
is optimal, let us ﬁrst assume that it is not optimal to invest at all, i.e., it = 0 and, thus,
also kt = 0 for all t. Recall that the Kuhn-Tucker parameter pi
t ≥ 0, if it is not optimal
to invest in period t. Thus, for the no investment path to be optimal, the following






Denoting Pi(0,0) by P 0
i and Pk(0,0) by P 0
k, and dividing by −δt−1P 0
k yields that the
ﬁrst marginal investment in period t is optimal, if investment has not been optimal in
any periods prior to period t and, in addition, condition (13) holds for period t.
If agents discount exponentially, then δn = βn. Inserting into condition (13) and using













1 − β(1 − γ)
. (15)
Obviously, this condition is independent of the period t. Hence, if investment is not
optimal at t = 1 then investment is also not optimal for all other periods t > 0. As a
consequence, if investment is not optimal in period 1, exponentially discounting agents
will never invest. Or, the other way round, if investment is optimal at all, exponentially
discounting agents always invest in period t = 1 (and if γ > 0 also in all later periods).
Recall that condition (4) holds for hyperbolically discounting agents. Thus, the right
hand side of condition (13) increases over time, while the left hand side remains unal-
tered. As a consequence, it is possible that investment is not optimal in period t = 1
but in some later periods t > 1.
￿
There are three insights to be gained from proposition 1. First, no investment in envi-
ronmental protection at all may be the ex ante optimal plan. This holds, as we do not
assume Inada conditions to hold for the payoﬀ function P. If the ﬁrst marginal unit
of investment exhibits only a ﬁnite payoﬀ, then the ﬁnite costs of this investment may
be always higher and, thus, investment is never optimal. This is the case, if condition
6(13) is violated for all periods t. Explicitly taking the no investment corner solution into
account, allows to scrutinize the question under which conditions there is investment at
all, which is often ruled out by assuming Inada conditions to hold.
Second, if agents discount exponentially, it is never optimal to invest in environmental
protection in later periods t > 1, if it is not optimal to invest in the ﬁrst period t = 1.
This holds, as, due to condition (3), the relative weights of costs and beneﬁts of the
ﬁrst marginal unit of investment in environmental protection remain unaltered by a
mere transition of the respective investment decision in time. This can be seen from the
investment condition (15), which is independent of the time period t.
Third, if agents discount hyperbolically, it is possible that, from an ex ante point of
view, investment in the ﬁrst marginal unit of environmental protection is optimal in later
periods t > 1, although it is not optimal to invest in the ﬁrst period t = 1. The reason
is that, due to condition (4), the costs of the ﬁrst marginal investment in environmental
protection stay constant by postponing investment into the future, while the beneﬁts
increase. Thus, eventually the beneﬁts may outweigh the costs, although this was not
the case for investment in the ﬁrst period. In this case, the condition (15) is violated for
t = 1, at the same time it holds for some later t > 1. Thus, postponing investment of
the ﬁrst marginal unit of environmental protection into the future is an ex ante optimal
outcome only for hyperbolically discounting agents.5
4 Ex post implemented investment
As already mentioned in section 2, hyperbolically discounting agents might not stick
to the ex ante optimal plan, if they re-evaluate it in later periods, because of the non-
stationarity of their preferences. Hence, depending on the behavioral pattern assumed,
the ex post actually implemented plan can diﬀer from the ex ante intertemporal optimal
plan. In the following, we show that, if the ex ante optimal plan suggests no investment
in the ﬁrst but positive investment in later periods, only committed agents will actually
invest in environmental protection.
4.1 Commitment
If agent 1 has the power to enforce the ex ante optimal plan, she would certainly do so,
as this is, by deﬁnition, the plan which maximizes her intertemporal welfare. According
to the analysis exposed in the former section, investment in environmental protection is
ex ante optimal, if the inequality (13) holds for some t. Obviously, in the case of such a
commitment, there will be investment in the ex post implemented plan in exactly that
amount and at exactly that time as the ex ante optimal plan suggested. The following
proposition summarizes this insight.
5 Note, however, that postponing investment can also be optimal for exponentially discounting agents
within other model frameworks. In particular, this is the case if future outcomes are risky (see, for
example, the option value framework developed by Dixit 1992 and Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
7Proposition 2 (Commitment)
Consider a society composed of hyperbolically discounting agents. Given the maximiza-
tion problem (5) and a commitment to the ex ante optimal plan, the society will invest
in environmental protection, if and only if condition (13) holds for some t ∈ N.
4.2 No commitment
If no commitment mechanism is available, the ex post outcome depends on the agents’
awareness of the time-inconsistency problem. Following the standard approach, we dis-
tinguish two diﬀerent behavioral patterns.
First, naive agents which are unaware of the fact that future agents might re-evaluate
and alter the plan that was optimal from their point of view. In general, the optimal
results derived by the re-evaluation do not coincide with the ex ante optimal plan,
because the relative weights of marginal welfare gains and losses between diﬀerent periods
have changed, due to condition (4). Second, sophisticated agents which anticipate future
agents’ deviation from the ex ante optimal plan. Time consistent planning is equivalent
to the solution of a non-cooperative sequential game against all other agents. The ex
post time consistent investment plan is the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this
game.
Let us turn to the question under which circumstances a society composed of either
naive or sophisticated agents will actually invest in environmental protection. We show
in the following that the conditions for which investment in environmental protection
actually occurs ex post are identical for naive and sophisticated agents. In fact, if agents
discount hyperbolically and there is no commitment to the ex ante optimal plan, then
investment in environmental protection will never occur, if it was not already optimal
in the ﬁrst period, even if each agent would like future agents to invest. The following
proposition elaborates on this result.
Proposition 3 (No commitment)
Consider a society composed of hyperbolically discounting agents. Given the maximiza-
tion problem (5) and no commitment to the ex ante optimal plan, the society will invest












i = Pi(0,0) and P 0
k = P(0,0).
In particular, this condition holds no matter whether agents are sophisticated or naive.
Proof: First, consider naive agents. The intertemporal optimization problem the naive
agent has to solve in every period t is similar to the ex ante optimization problem (5).
Yet, the inherited level of environmental protection kt is determined by the investment
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As in the calculation in section 3.1, one derives the following system of equations for
every period t, which determines the investment in period t and the putative optimal








Following the same argument as described in detail in the proof of proposition 1 in section
3.2, the ﬁrst marginal investment in environmental protection in period t is assessed to











This condition is independent of the time period t. As a consequence, if investment in
environmental protection is not optimal in the ﬁrst period t = 1, then it is also not
optimal from the succeeding naive agents’ point of view in period t > 1, even if the ex
ante optimal plan suggested investment at some later time period t > 1, as all later
agents face (from their point of view) exactly the same investment decision, which is
described by condition (16).
Second, consider sophisticated agents, which anticipate later agents deviation from the
ex ante optimal plan. Thus, every agent t plays the best investment strategy, anticipat-
ing the best investment strategies of all future players and accounting for the investment
decisions of past players only in so far as they determine the inherited level of environ-
mental protection kt. Hence, given the investment strategies of all future agents, each
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9Note that each agent t only maximizes over it and considers all other investment decisions
is (s  = t) as given. Analogously to the calculation in section 3.1, we derive the following








The condition for an MPE is that this equation holds simultaneously for all agents t ∈ N.
As shown by Karp (2005) in a similar model setting, the MPE is, in general, not
unique under hyperbolic discounting. However, it can be shown that if no investment in
all periods t is Markov perfect then it is the unique MPE. To see this, suppose that no











Again, this condition is not contingent on t. Existence is granted, as the no investment
MPE (i.e., it = 0, ∀t) is obviously feasible. Uniqueness, however, requires that there
is no other set of Markov strategies which satisﬁes conditions (21) and (22) for all
agents t simultaneously. To see this, consider agent t’s best investment decision given
the investment decisions of all other agents. The net marginal welfare gain agent t
achieves for a marginal investment in environmental protection decreases the more she
invests and the more all future agents invest, as Pii < 0 and Pkk < 0. Moreover, because
of Pik ≤ 0 the marginal costs of investment for agent t increase (or stay constant) and
because of Pkk < 0 marginal future gains decrease the more past agents have invested,
and thus, the higher is the level of environmental protection agent t inherits from her
predecessors. Therefore, if the marginal costs of investment outweigh the discounted
sum of all future marginal beneﬁts even in the case of no investment in all periods t
(condition 22), this is always the case no matter how much other agents invest. Hence,
if no investment in all periods t is Markov perfect, no investment is a dominant strategy
for agent t, irrespective of the strategies of all other agents. As this holds for all agents
t, the no investment MPE is unique.
Turning it the other way round, a society comprised of sophisticated hyperbolically
discounting agents will invest in environmental protection, only if no investment is not
an MPE and, thus, the condition (16) holds.
￿
A direct consequence of proposition 3 is that, in the absence of a commitment mechanism,
society never invests in environmental protection if it was not already ex ante optimal to
invest in period t = 1. Hence, in case of no commitment, an ex ante optimal postponing
of investment actually results in an inﬁnite ex post procrastination, i.e., agents postpone
investment in environmental protection inﬁnitely into the future, even though investment
was optimal in the long run from an ex ante point of view.
It might seem odd at ﬁrst sight that it does not matter whether agents are sophis-
ticated or naive. Note, however, that this only holds if there is no investment at all
10ex post.6 This coincidence hinges upon the assumption of Markov beliefs, in which the
other players’ actions are only considered in so far as they inﬂuence the stock variable
environmental protection. Both naive and sophisticated agents consider past decisions
only in so far as they inﬂuence the stock, and the misperception of the naive agents of
future decisions does not play a crucial role, as no investment is a dominant strategy.
Although there is no diﬀerence in the actual outcome, if investment is not optimal in
the ﬁrst period but in the long run from an ex ante point of view, there is a diﬀerence
between naive and sophisticated agents in the perception of future events. While the
sophisticated agents are well aware that not only themselves but also all future agents
will not invest in environmental protection, the naive agents stick to the misguided belief
that, although they do not invest themselves, some future agents will.
4.3 Welfare analysis
Obviously, in the case of a commitment, society is more likely to invest in environmental
protection than in the cases where no commitment mechanism is available. In the latter
case, an ex ante optimal investment delay implies inﬁnite ex post procrastination, i.e.,
ex post no investment will be made over the whole time horizon, even though this was
optimal in the long run from an ex ante point of view. In the former case, the inﬁnite
ex post procrastination may be overcome by committing all future agents to the ex ante
optimal plan. Hence, it is possible that ex post no investment is undertaken in period
t = 1 but in later periods t > 1.
The question arising is whether ex post procrastination leads to ineﬃcient outcomes
or not. Applying the Pareto criterion, an ex post implemented plan is eﬃcient if it is
not possible to increase the intertemporal welfare of one agent without decreasing the
welfare of at least one other agent. Let agent t’s ex post derived welfare be given by
equation (2), when inserting the actually implemented ex post plan. Then, the following
proposition can be shown to hold.
Proposition 4 (Intertemporal welfare)
Consider a society composed of hyperbolically discounting agents. Given the maximiza-
tion problem (5), the ex post implemented plan is always Pareto optimal if the ex ante
optimal plan is enforced, and may be Pareto inferior in the case of naive and sophisticated
agents.
Proof: Obviously, a commitment to the ex ante optimal plan is always Pareto optimal,
as the ex ante optimal plan is unique, due to the curvature properties of the Hamiltonian,
and, therefore, any deviation from it would decrease agent 1’s welfare (otherwise it would
not have been optimal in the ﬁrst place).
We show that the no investment MPE in the case that the ex ante optimal plan
suggests to postpone investment to later periods may be ineﬃcient by constructing a
simple example. For a more convenient formal presentation, assume that agents discount
quasi-hyperbolically:
δn = αβ
n, n ∈ N . (23)
6 In general, the ex post implemented plans diﬀer in the case of positive investment.















1 − β(1 − γ)
. (25)
To assess, if a Pareto improvement is possible, consider the welfare eﬀect of a marginal
investment ∆i1 of agent 1. In return, all other agents t compensate agent 1 by investment





























According to inequalities (24) and (25), the ﬁrst term is negative and each term of the










































Again, the welfare gain due to agent t’s own investment is negative, while the welfare
gain due to all other agents s (s  = t) is positive. If all agents t  = 1 invest to such an
extent that the net welfare gain ∆Wt = 0, then a Pareto improvement is possible, if
∆W1 is positive.
To see that cases exist, where Pareto improvement is possible and, therefore, the no
investment MPE is Pareto ineﬃcient, assume that only agent 1 and agent 2 invest. In
this case, it is obvious from equation (27) that ∆Wt > 0 for t > 2. Assuming that agent
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i
. (28)




























1−β(1−γ) + P 0
i
. (29)
12For an example, set P 0
i = −5, P 0
k = 1, α = 0.7, β = 0.95 and γ = 0.1. Given these
numbers ∆i2 = 0.694, indicating that agent 2’s welfare gain equals zero if she invests
69.4% of agent 1’s marginal investment. Furthermore ∆W1/∆i1 > 0 and, therefore, a
Pareto improvement can be achieved if both agents 1 and 2 depart from the no investment
MPE.
￿
Proposition 4 states that, if the ex ante optimal plan suggests to postpone investment
to later periods and is not enforceable, the ex post implemented plan may be ineﬃcient.
If it is so, however, hinges upon the possibility of future agents to compensate earlier
agents for a deviation from the no investment MPE, which is determined by the marginal
cost of investment P 0
i , the marginal beneﬁt of investment P 0
k, the deterioration rate γ
and the series of discount factors δn.
If the no investment MPE is ineﬃcient, society faces the standard Prisoners’ Dilemma:
The MPE is not Pareto eﬃcient, while the Pareto eﬃcient outcome is not Markov perfect
and, therefore, unlikely to be implemented ex post. Even if agent 1 decides to deviate
from the no investment MPE and invests in environmental protection in the ﬁrst period,
there are no incentives for agent 2 to deviate from the no investment strategy, as no
investment is the dominant strategy irrespective of the investment decisions of all other
agents.
Moreover, due to the sequential nature of the problem, standard coordination mech-
anisms like enforcement or agreement do not work. First, it is diﬃcult to think of a
mechanism to ensure the enforcement of the ex ante optimal or any other Pareto opti-
mal plan. By deﬁnition, investment in period t is under control of agent t. Why should
future generations obey a plan which is suboptimal from their point of view and how
could past generations force them to do so? Second, the diﬀerent generations cannot
agree on a Pareto optimal strategy as they do not live at the same time. Moreover, im-
plicit agreement is also unlikely as there are no means for earlier generations to monitor
later generations’ investment decisions and punish them for deviation from the implicitly
agreed plan.
5 Discussion
It is well known from the literature that hyperbolically discounting agents tend to post-
pone actions into the future from an ex ante point of view, as declining discount rates
imply a change of the relative weight of beneﬁts and losses. It is also well known that
naive agents tend to further procrastinate actions from an ex post point of view, as
they are not aware of the time-inconsistency problem and that this outcome may be
ineﬃcient (e.g., Ackerlof 1991, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Yet, the interesting result
derived from the exposition so far is that, no matter whether agents are sophisticated or
naive, they will never invest in environmental protection if agent 1 does not invest. In
this section, we show which assumptions drive these results and discuss the implications
for the design of environmental policies.
135.1 Model assumptions
The inﬁnite ex post procrastination results from the assumption that the payoﬀ function
P depends only on investment it and the stock kt of environmental protection and that
the initial stock of environmental protection k1 = 0. In the following, we brieﬂy consider
how the results change, if we allow for an initial capital stock k1 > 0 or an explicit
time-dependence of the payoﬀ function P = P(it,kt,t).
Following an analogous approach as outlined in the proof of proposition 1, the ﬁrst
marginal investment in environmental protection is optimal for a positive initial stock








where kt = (1−γ)t−1k1 denotes the exponentially decaying initial stock of environmental
protection. As ∂Pk(0,kt)/∂t > 0, it may even happen for exponentially discounting
agents that the ex ante optimal plan suggests not to invest in environmental protection
in the ﬁrst but a later period. However, what happens if agents discount hyperbolically
and no commitment to the ex ante optimal plan is possible? Following an analogous
approach as outlined in the proof to proposition 3, ex post investment is only optimal






Because of condition (4), the right hand side of condition (31) is smaller than the right
hand side of condition (30). As a consequence, ex post the agents are, in general, not
investing at the period the ex ante optimal plan suggests, but do so, if at all, later.7
Again, it may happen that no investment is actually carried out for the whole time
horizon, although the ex ante optimal plan suggested to do so. Also, the condition for
the ﬁrst marginal investment to be optimal are identical for naive and sophisticated
agents and given by condition (31).
We now turn to the assumption of a time-invariant payoﬀ function P. For example,
this neglects problems where doing nothing worsens the environmental problem and,
therefore, increases marginal beneﬁts of investments in environmental protection over
time. This is the case when the environmental problem is caused by a stock pollutant
with increasing marginal damage. Then, no investment in the beginning would lead
to an accumulation of the pollution stock and, therefore, would only be optimal until
the marginal costs of investment are eventually outweighed by the marginal damage
of an additional unit of pollutant. Another example, which is not covered by the as-
sumptions made about the payoﬀ function P, is technical progress in environmental
protection. Technological change or learning-by-doing would decrease the marginal costs
7 Due to the discrete model setup, the case might happen that hyperbolically discounting agents actu-
ally do invest in the period suggested by the ex ante optimal plan, but not in the proposed amount.
14of investment over time and might eventually reach a level, where the marginal beneﬁts
of investment in environmental protection outweigh the marginal costs.
Let us now assume that the payoﬀ function P is explicitly time dependend, i.e., P =
P(it,kt,t). Then, the ﬁrst marginal investment in environmental protection is optimal














In the following, we investigate two interesting cases for the time dependence of P, the
ﬁrst corresponding to stock pollutants with increasing marginal damage, i.e., ∂Pk/∂t > 0,
and the second to decreasing investment costs due to technical progress, i.e., ∂Pi/∂t > 0.
The ﬁrst case is analogously to the case of an initial stock of environmental protection.
As the marginal beneﬁt of environmental protection increases over time, the right hand
side of conditions (32) and (33) increase over time. If the costs of investment due to tech-
nological progress decrease, then the left hand side of conditions (32) and (33) decrease
over time. In both cases, it may be optimal from an ex ante point of view, not to invest in
the ﬁrst but in a later period (even if agents discount exponentially). However, if agents
discount hyperbolically and no commitment to the ex ante optimal plan is possible, it
might happen that no investment is actually carried out over the whole time horizon,
although the ex ante optimal plan suggested to do so. Moreover, if investment is actually
carried out, it is, in general, postponed to later periods than the ex ante optimal plan
suggests. Again, the condition for the ﬁrst marginal unit of investment to be optimal is
identical for naive and sophisticated agents.
In summary, the assumptions of no explicit time-dependence of the payoﬀ function
and the absence of an initial stock of environmental protection lead to the clear cut
result that uncommitted hyperbolically discounting agents will never invest, if they do
not invest in the ﬁrst period, no matter whether they are naive or sophisticated. Yet,
the result is qualitatively robust if time-dependence of the payoﬀ function and initial
capital stocks are considered, as it is still the case that the conditions for investment to
be optimal are stricter ex post than ex ante and, thus, procrastination of investment is
likely (although not necessarily inﬁnite). Moreover, the conditions for the ﬁrst marginal
unit of investment to be optimal are identical for both naive and sophisticated agents.
A crucial assumption for the ex ante optimal plan to suggest no investment in the ﬁrst
but in later periods is that the payoﬀ function does not satisfy the Inada conditions,
as the Inada conditions rule out corner solutions. No investment is a corner solution in
the sense that the non-negativity constraint for investment is binding for some periods
t. It is also the non-negativity constraint which guarantees, together with the assump-
tion that Pik ≤ 0, that the no-investment MPE is unique. As shown by Karp (2005)
15in a similar model setting, the MPE is in general not unique. In fact, analyzing the
unconstrained optimization problem would lead to multiple MPE with a continuum of
negative stationary state levels of environmental protection, which are condensed by the
feasibility constraint to the unique no-investment MPE. However, even if Pik > 0 and
ex ante procrastination leads to multiple MPE,8 the no-investment MPE is still Markov
perfect and, therefore, a credible ex post outcome.
5.2 Policy implications
Although our results have been derived from a stylized theoretical model, there are some
immediate policy implications to be drawn. First, our result that without a commitment
mechanism hyperbolic discounting can lead to an inﬁnite ex post procrastination ques-
tions the application of hyperbolic discounting in long-term cost-beneﬁt analysis. Yet,
HM Treasury (2003) requires hyperbolic discounting in the evaluation of the UK Gov-
ernments investment decisions for projects exceeding a 30 year time horizon. In light
of our results, the UK government is well adviced to reconsider this policy or at least
investigate the possibility of commitment mechanisms.
Second, our theoretical results are consistent with real world observations. In fact,
hyperbolic discounting oﬀers a new explanation for unsatisfactory policy performance in
the context of long-run environmental problems. Take as an example the stabilization
of greenhouse gases to prevent, or at least reduce, anthropogenic climate change.9 The
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was open to signature in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992 and at the UN headquarters thereafter, received the signatures of
186 states. The signatory developed countries agreed as a ﬁrst step to stabilize their
greenhouse gas emissions at their 1990 levels by 2000. Despite their sincere intention
at the date of signature, most countries have failed to do so. Similar outcomes can be
observed with the subsequent Kyoto protocol which was signed in December 1997. In
this treaty the developed countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to
95% of their 1990 levels by 2008–2012. Some countries which signed the protocol now
refuse to ratify it (e.g., USA and Australia). Also many countries which ratiﬁed Kyoto
are still far from their promised emission targets. Moreover, the countries which already
met, or are likely to meet, their targets by 2008 have done so more by accident than by
deliberate action (Pearce 2003).
These facts ﬁt perfectly with the behavior we would expect if governments make
decisions on the basis of hyperbolic discounting (although they might be not aware of it)
and the ex ante optimal plan suggests to postpone investment to later periods. Although
the governments intended to act in the future at the time they signed the treaties, they
failed to do so because of ex post procrastination.
Although hyperbolic discounting is clearly not the sole possible explanation for the
8 Note that the assumption Pik ≤ 0 is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for the uniqueness of
the no-investment MPE.
9 Although anthropogenic climate change is a stock pollutant problem which is likely to exhibit increas-
ing marginal damage, the case is applicable to the results of the model presented as the Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto protocol only limit emissions.
16unsatisfactory performance of the Kyoto protocol (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer 1999, Victor
2001, B¨ ohringer 2003), it should not be dismissed, for three reasons. First, other examples
also support the observation that governments might discount hyperbolically rather than
exponentially. Hepburn (2003) shows that the discrepancies between the forecast and
actual development of the northern Atlantic cod population is consistent with naive
hyperbolically discounting agents. Another example is the ongoing procrastination in
solving the ﬁnal nuclear waste disposal problem. Although Proops (2001) argues from a
political discourse perspective, the observations are also consistent with hyperbolically
discounting governments.
Second, if the hyperbolic discounting explanation plays a role, this gives rise to severe
concerns about the future, as ex ante optimal investment delays lead inevitably to (in-
ﬁnite) ex post procrastination. Moreover, even awareness of the problem does not help,
as sophisticated agents perform as badly as naive agents.
Third, in the case of sophisticated agents, hyperbolic discounting introduces a second
strategic dimension to the problem of the long-run mitigation of anthropogenic climate
change which hinders its solution. The ﬁrst strategic dimension is spatial, as climate
change is a global environmental problem and, thus, the question of “burden sharing”
arises, i.e., which country cuts emissions of greenhouse gases by how much (e.g., Endres
and Finus 1999, 2002, Rubio and Casino 2005, Yang 2003). The second strategic dimen-
sion is the intertemporal nature of the investment game the sophisticated agents play
against each other. Thus, we might face a “two-dimensional Prisoner’s Dilemma” in the
solution of global (environmental) problems.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed optimal intertemporal investment in environmental pro-
tection for a society consisting of hyperbolically discounting agents. Because of the non-
stationarity of hyperbolic preferences, the ex post observed outcome crucially depends
on additional behavioral constraints. As prime examples we have discussed the commit-
ted, the naive and the sophisticated agents. The well known result that naive agents
tend to (inﬁnitely) postpone actions into the future has been extended by the result
that sophisticated agents perform as badly as naive agents if the ex ante optimal plan
suggests investment in the long-run but not in the present.
In the model framework analyzed we have shown that, no matter whether the agents
are naive or sophisticated, an ex ante optimal investment delay implies an inﬁnite ex post
procrastination, i.e., there is no investment in environmental protection in all periods,
although this has been optimal from an ex ante point of view. This inﬁnite ex post delay is
the result of the assumption that the payoﬀ function does only depend on the investment
and the level of environmental protection and that marginal costs of investment do not
decrease with the level of environmental protection. Nevertheless, even if inﬁnite ex post
procrastination is overcome by increasing marginal beneﬁts or decreasing marginal costs
of investment the qualitative results are fairly robust.
Furthermore, we have shown that, in the absence of a commitment mechanism, the ex
17post implemented plan may lead to a Pareto ineﬃcient intertemporal outcome. However,
ineﬃciency is not guaranteed in general, but hinges upon the set of exogenously given
parameters on the discount factors δn, and the marginal costs P 0
i of investment and the
marginal beneﬁts P 0
k of environmental protection. On the one hand, the results question
the application of hyperbolic discounting in the cost-beneﬁt analysis of long-term envi-
ronmental projects. On the other hand, they give rise to concern as they are consistent
with real world observations of unsatisfactory policy performance. In a sense, it might
be that the crucial question is not whether to adopt hyperbolic discounting in long-term
decision making or not, but, given that decision makers discount hyperbolically, how can
we design environmental policies to exclude the (from every generation’s point of view)
unsatisfactory and often also ineﬃcient outcome of an inﬁnite ex post procrastination.
Clearly, a commitment mechanism would solve the problem. Cropper and Laibson
(1999), for example, suggest to Pareto improve the outcome by subsidizing the interest
rate. Their crucial assumption is that the eﬀect of implemented policies occur with a
time-lag, which is in fact a commitment for the next period. Another possible commit-
ment device is a supra-national organization such as the European Union, which enforces
environmental legislation to be adopted by member states and also has the power to
punish in the case of non-compliance. However, especially in a long-term and intergen-
erational setting, the enforcement power of the present generation is very limited (and
also questionable on ethical grounds as this implies a dictatorship of the present over
the future generations). Hence, the solution of this problem is open to future research.
Finally, it is worth noting that, although our model was primarily designed to address
long-run environmental problems, the results extend to other investment decisions of a
long-run and intergenerational nature, such as education, health insurance and pension
schemes.
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